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602 HAMASAKI V. FLOTHO [39 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 22006. In Bank. Oct. 9, 1952.] 
TOSHIO HA~IASAKI, a l\Iinor, etc., et al., Respondents, v. 
FRED W. FLOTHO, SR., et a1., Appellants. 
[1] New Trial-Award as to Part of Issues.-Although the grant-
ing of a new trial limited to the issue of damages rests pri-
marily in the discretion of the trial court, it is an abuse of 
discretion to grant such a new trial if the question of liability 
is close, if the damages awarded Ilre grossly inadequate, and 
if there are other circumstances which indicate that the ver-
dict was the result of prejudice or an improper compromise. 
[21., 2b] Id.-Award as to. Part of Issnes.-An order granting 
plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the single issue of dam-
ages in an automobile accident case will be reversed where the 
evidence was conflicting as to the negligence of defendant 
driver and the contributory negligence of a plaintiff almost 6 
years old who was struck by the automobile on crossing a 
street; where a verdict of $1,000 allowing only $182.90 for 
general damages was inadequate compensation for brain con-
cussion, a broken clavicll!, various skull fractures and other 
injuries sustained by him; and where other circumstances, such 
as the trial judge's proposal to allow $6,682.90 for general 
damages if defendants would consent thereto, indicate that the 
verdict was the result of an improper compromise. 
[8] Id.-Award as to Part of Issnes.-A new trial limited to the 
damages issue may be ordered by the trial court when it can 
reasonably be said that the liability issue has been determined 
by the jury. 
[4] Id.-Award as to Part of Issnes.-Gross inadequacy of un-
liquidated general damages awarded by a jury is usually con-
vincing evidence that it failed to make a decision of the lia-
bility issue, so as to render improper the granting of a new 
trial limited to the damages issue. 
[5] Id.-Award as to Part of Issnes.-Generally it is'only when 
the verdict allows a substantial, even though inadequate, 
amount for general damages that it can reasonably be con-
cluded that the jury's error related solely to the damages 
issue. 
[6] Appeal-Review-Final Judgment.-An order denying a mo-
tion for new trial may be reviewed only through an appeal 
from the judgment. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., New Trial, § 16; Am.Jur., New Trial, § 21. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-5] New Trial, § 15.1; [6] Appeal and 
Error, § 1039; [7] ~ew Trial, § 253; [8,10-12,14] New Trial, § 15; 
[9] Appeal and Error, § 1004; [13] New Trial, § 225. 
/J 
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[7] New Trial-Appeal-Disposition.-On appeal from an order 
granting a motion for n limited new trial, the appellate court 
has jurisdiction to do no more than the trial court itself could 
have done. 
[8] ld.-Award as to Part of lssues.-A .party seeking relief in 
the trial court by way of a new trial may ordinarily seek a 
retrial only of the issues on which the decision has been ad-
verse to him. 
[9] Appeal-Review on Appeal from Part of Judgment.-In case 
of partial appeals the court may review as much of the judg-
ment as is necessary to give appellant the relief he seeks, even 
though it is necessllry to reverse parts of the judgment with 
which he has no quarrel and from which neither party has 
appealed. 
[10] New Trial-Motion for Limited New Trial-Powers of Court. 
-When the issues of liability and damages are so interwoven 
that a new trial limited to damages alone would be unfair to 
defendant, the trial court may order a complete new trial 
although the only motic.n is by plaintiff for a limited new trial. 
[11] ld.-Motion for Limited New Trial-Powers of Court.-It is 
not necessary to limit the jurisdiction of the trial court in 
passing on a motion for a partial new trial to prevent a com-
plete new trial in case neither party wants it; if defendant 
does not wish a new trial he need not move for one, and if 
plaintiff does not wish a complete new trial, if he cannot have 
a partial new trial, he need simply say so. 
[12] ld.-Motion for Limited New Trial-Powers of Court.-The 
1929 amendment of Code Civ. Proc., § 657, relatiDg to powers 
of trial court on motion for new trial, does not prevent the 
trial court from ordering a new trial on all issues when the 
motion is limited to the single issue of damages. 
[13] ld.-Procedure-Powers of Court on Ruling on Motion.-AI-
though the application of an aggrieved party is a jurisdictional 
requirement for new trial proceedings in California, there is no 
direct suggestion in Code Civ. Proc., § 657, that the trial court, 
in correcting the error complained of, is limited to the method 
specified in the application. 
[14] ld.-Purpose of Amendment of Code Provision.-Changes in 
1929 amendment of Code Civ. Proc., § 657, were iDtended to 
relate solely to subject matter of § 662, empowering the court 
to amend the findings and judgment, and were not designed to 
alter the jurisdictional effect of a motion for new trial. (Dis-
approving Quevedo v. Superior Court, 131 CaI.App. 698, 21 P.2d 
,998, insofar as it holds to the contrary.) 
[9] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 535; Am.Jur., Appeal 
and Error, § 822. 
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APPEAL from an unlet· of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County granting a new trial on the issue of damages 
only. Harold B. ,Jeffery, ,Judge. Heversed with directions. 
Parker, Stanbury & Heese and Haymond G. Stanbury for 
Appellants. 
Culbert L. Olson, John H. Carter and Richard C. Olson 
for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plailltiff Toshio Hamasaki was struck by 
an automobile driven by defendant Fred Flotho, Jr. '!'he 
latter was acting in the course of his employment by defend-
ant Leland and was using the car with the consent of its 
owner, defendant Fred Flotho, Sr. Toshio and his father 
brought this action to recover for injuries and medical ex-
penses. 
The accident occurred in a residential neighborhood while 
Toshio, who was then not quite 6 years of age, was crossing 
the street in the middle of the block. At the trial plaintiffs 
contended that the defendant driver was traveling at an ex-
cessive rate of speed and was not maintaining a reasonable 
lookout for pedestrians. Defendants contended that the driver 
was not speeding and that plaintiff suddenly darted from 
behind a parked truck into the path of the automobile. Al-
though it was conceded that Toshio was severely injured, the 
extent of his injuries was contested. 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs for 
$1,000. Defendants' motion for a new trial was denied. Plain-
tiffs' motion for a new trial on the issue of damages only was 
granted after defendants refused to consent to a judgment 
of $7,500. Defendants have appealed from the order grant-
ing plaintiffs' motion. There is no appeal from the judgment. 
Defendants do not claim that the damages awarded by the 
jury are adequate. It is their position that the jury com-
promised the liability issue and that liability was therefore 
never determined. They suggest even that the verdict is "less 
than a compromise," that is, that the jury concluded de-
fendants were not liable but nevertheless, out of sympathy, 
allowed plaintiffs approximately the amount of the special 
damages. 
[1] Although the granting of a new trial limited to the 
issue of damages rests primarily in the discretion of the trial 
court, it is an abuse of discretion to grant such a new trial 
) 
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fractures of the skull. Three of the skull fractures were ex-
tensive; one of them resulted in a separation of almost half 
an inch and a depression of almost one-quarter of an inch. 
There were two puncture wounds in the forehead, the cover-
ings of the left eyeball were swollen, and the pupils were un-
equal. There was also a bilateral ankle clonus. This much 
was not contested. In addition there was medical testimony 
that as a result of the accident Toshio was suffering from 
permanent psychomotor epilepsy and that he would require 
continuous medical care throughout the remainder of his 
life. This latter evidence, however, was disputed by defend-
ants' medical experts. Toshio's teachers :were in disagreement 
as to whether or not he had made a substantial recovery inso-
far as his school activities were concerned. 
Even if the jurors rejected the evidence of permanent in-
jury, it is inconceivable that they regarded $182.90 as ade-
quate compensation for the brain concussion, the broken 
clavicle, the various skull fractures, and the other injuries 
admittedly sustained. The conclusion is inescapable that the 
verdict was not the result of an effort to assess the pecuniary 
value of Toshio's suffering. Had the jury truly believed that 
defendants were liable, the verdict would have been for many 
times this amount. 
Plaintiffs contend, however, that whenever the jury allows 
full compensation for special damages and any amount, no 
matter how small, for general damages, the trial court's de-
cision to allow a limited new trial will not be reversed on 
appeal. Such a view offers the convenience of a mechanical 
formula, but it ignores the principles that govern the granting 
of partial new trials. [3] A new trial limited to the dam-
ages issue may be ordered by the trial court when it can 
reasonably be said that the liability issue has been determined 
by the jury. [4] A refusal to allow for undisputed special 
damages is usually convincing evidence that the jury failed 
to make a decision of the liability issue, and that circumstance 
has therefore been stressed in a number of appellate opinions. 
(See Wallace v. Miller, 26 Ca1.App.2d 55, 56 [78 P.2d 745] ; 
Donnatin v. Fnion Hardware &7 Jfetal Co., 38 Cal.App. 8, 11 
r175 P. 26. 177 P. 8451.) Tn a particular case, however, gross 
inad('«(1Htc~' of unliquidated general damages may be just as 
('ol1vinr.ing. Thus, in Sl~mmons v. Fish, 210 Mass. 563, 571 [97 
N.E. 102, Ann.Cas. 1912D 588], it was held that a verdict of 
$200 for the loss of an eye was a conclusive indication that 
the jury had compromised the issues of liability and damages. 
) 
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(See, also, Schuerholz v. Roach, 58 F.2d 32, 34 [$625 for loss 
of eye] ; Keogh v. Maulding, 52 Cal.App.2d 17, 21 [125 P.2cl 
858] [verdict for $291.23 more than undisputed damages].) 
[5] As a general rule, it is only when the verdict allows a 
substantial, even though inadeqnate, amount for general dam-
ages that it can reasonably be concluded that the jury's error 
related solely to the damages issue. (Hughes v. Schwartz, 51 
Cal.App.2d 362, 368 [124 P.2d 886] ; McNear v. Pacific Grey-
hound Lines, 63 Cal.App.2d 11,16 [146 P.2d 34}.) In view of 
Toshio's serious injuries, $182.90 cannot be regarded as sub-
stantial. 
Taylor v. Pole, 16 Ca1.2d 668, 675 [107 P.2d 614], does not 
conflict with the foregoing authorities. In that case the error 
necessitating a new trial directly involved the trial court's in-
structions regarding damages. Moreover, the evidence of de-
fendant's liability was" overwhelming." The new trial was 
therefore limited to the damages issue even though, as to one 
of the plaintiffs, the jury had awarded less than the undis-
puted special damages. (See, also, Crandall v. McGrath, 51 
Cal.App.2d 438, 440-442 [124 P.2d 858) ; L01lghran v. McKen-
na, 60 R.I. 453, 457 [199 A. 302] ; cf Keogh v. Maulding, 52 
Cal.App.2d 17, 21-22 [125 P.2d 858].) In the present case 
the jury was properly instructed concerning damages and the 
issue of liability was close, so that the grossly inadequate 
award cannot reasonably be explained as a mere error of the 
jury in the assessment of damages. 
[2b] (3) Other circumstances indicating compromise. The 
order granting plaintiffs' motion for a limited new trial pro-
vided that if defendants would consent to a judgment of 
*7,500, the motion would be deemed denied. This proposal 
of the trial judge thus allowed $6,682.90 for general damages-
more than 36 times the $182.90 allowed in the verdict. The 
great disparity between the jury's determination and that of 
the judge provides an additional and striking indication that 
the jurors could not agree on the liability issne and that those 
who believed defendants were liable consented to inadequate 
damages in return for the votes of those who had decided that 
defendants should pay nothing. 
Our conclusion that the verdict was the result of an im-
proper compromise necessitates a reversal of the order grant-
ing a limited new trial. 
Plaintiffs contend that in the event a limited new trial is 
denied them they should be given a new trial on all issues. 
Unquestionably plaintiffs have been prejudiced by the jury's 
) 
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inadequate award, anli they woukl ordinarily be entitled to a 
reversal of the judgment on that gruund. Defendants urge, 
however, that under the special circulllstances of this appeal we 
have no jurisdiction to do more than affirm or reverse the 
trial court's orlicr and that we caunut dircct a complete new 
trial. 
[6] No appeal lies from the trial court's denial of defend-
ants' motion for new trial; that ruling may be reviewed only 
through an appeal from the judgment. (City of Los Angeles v. 
Glassell, 203 Cal. 44, 46 [262 P. 1084] ; Litvinltk v. Litvinuk, 
27 Ca1.2d 38, 42 [162 P.2d 8] ; Caldwell v. Caldwell, 80 Cal. 
App.2d 378, 384 [182 P.2d 258].) Defendants have not ap-
pealed from the judgment, and, since timely notice of appeal is 
a jurisdictional requirement (Estate of Hanley, 23 Ca1.2d 120, 
122 [142 P.2d 423, 149 A.L.R. 1250]), we are without juris-
diction to review the judgment or the denial of defendants' 
motion. 
[7] The only appeal before us is that from the order 
granting plaintiffs' motion for a limited new trial. In dispos-
ing of this appeal we have jurisdiction to do no more than the 
trial court itself could have done. (See Tomales Bay Oyster 
Corp. v. Superior Court, 35 Ca1.2d 389, 392 [217 P.2d 968] ; 
Crescent Feather Co. v. United Upholsterers' Union, 153 Cal. 
433,434 [95 P. 871] ; Byxbee v. Dewey, 128 Cal. 322, 326 [60 
P. 847] ; Wheeler v. Bolton, 92 Cal. 159, 167 [28 P. 558] ; Blox-
ham v. Tehama County Tel. Co., 29 Cal.App. 326, 340 [155 P. 
654].) The controlling question, therefore, is whether or not 
the trial court, on plaintiffs' motion for a new trial on the issue 
of damages only, had power to grant a new trial on all issues. 
This question is analogous to that presented when an appeal· 
is taken from only a part of a judgment. To simplify liti-
gation a party who is aggrieved by a judgment is ordinarily 
entitled to limit his appeal to the parts thereof with which 
he is dissatisfied. [8] Similarly, when he is seeking relief 
in the trial court by way of a new trial, he ordinarily may 
seek a retrial only of the issues on which the decision has been 
adverse to him. In either case, however, situations may arise 
where the issues are so interwoven that a partial retrial would 
be unfair to the other party. When, as in the present case, 
for instance, the jury has, by compromising the issues of 
liability and damages, inextricably interwoven those issues, 
a retrial of the damages issue alone based on the erroneous 
assumption that defendant's liability has been determined 
would be extremely unjust to him. A situation is thus pre-
) 
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se11ted where the plaintiff has been aggrieved, but the specific 
relief he seeks may not be granted without doing an injustice 
to the defendant. Sincc the relief requested may not be 
granted, the trial court, if the issue is presented by motion 
for a limited new trial, or the appellate court, if the issue is 
presented by a partial appeal, must do one of two things. It 
must either deny all relief, or order a new trial on both issues; 
[9] In the case of partial appeals it is settled that the court 
may review as much of the judgment as is necessary to give 
the appellant the relief he seeks even though it is necessary 
to reverse parts of the judgment with which he has no quarrel 
and from which neither party has appealed. (Milo v. Prior, 
210 Cal. 569, 571 [292 P. 647] j Blacke v. B14cke, 37 CaUd 
531, 538 [233 P.2d 547] j 4merican Enterprise, Inc. v. Van 
Winkle, ante, p. 210 [246 P.2d 935] ; Bailey v. Bailey, 60 Cal. 
App.2d 291, 293 [140 P.2d 693].) [10] Logically the same 
rule should govern the trial court when passing on a motion 
for a limited new trial. 
[11] It is suggested that in a particular ease both parties 
may prefer the judgment as originally entered to the expense 
and uncertainty of a new trial on all issues, and that therefore 
the trial court should not have jurisdiction to grant a complete 
new trial in the absence of a motion therefor. There is no 
reason why, if a limited new trial· cannot be granted, the 
parties should not be allowed to adopt the jury's compromise 
as their own. In such a case, however, the trial court would 
undoubtedly respect their preference in this respect and deny 
any new trial at all. (Cf., Leipert v. Honold, ante, p. 462 
[247 P.2d 324].) Accordingly, it is not necessary to limit 
the jurisdiction of the trial court in passing upon a motion 
for a partial new trial to prevent a complete new trial that 
neither party wants. If the defendant does not wish a new 
trial he need not move for one, and if the plaintiff does not 
wish a complete new trial, if he cannot have a partial new 
trial, he need simply say so. 
On its face, however, a motion for a limited new trial gives 
no inkling that the plaintiff would prefer no new trial to a 
complete new trial. Before such a preference could be inferred 
it would be necessary to assume his knowledge of a rule that 
the trial court could only grant or deny the motion as made. 
To adopt such a rule would thus create a procedural trap for 
those unwary of the niceties of practice, who, following the 
natural in.stinct to ask only for what they wished would dis-
39 C.JcI...4O 
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cover they coulu receive nothing because they asked for too 
much. It is no answer to say that the plaintiff could extricate 
himself from this trap by appealing from the judgment after 
his motion for a limited new trial was denied. The power of 
the appellate court to reverse a judgment because of the 
inadequacy of the damages is much more limited than that 
of the trial court to grant a new trial for the same reason, and 
thus in most cases the plaintiff must secure relief from the 
trial court if he is to secure it at all. 
[12] Defendants contend, however, that by amending sec-
tion 657 of the Code of Civil Proceure in 1929, the Legislature 
adopted the rule that a trial court may not order a new trial 
on all issues when the motion is limited to the issue of 
damages alone. Although this contention is supported by 
Quevedo v. Superior Court, 131Cal.App. 698 [21 P.2d 998], 
the court in that case did not consider the analogous rule 
applicable to partial appeals, and we have concluded that its 
interpretation of the amendment to the statute was erroneous. 
Before 1929, section 657 read: "The former verdict or other 
decision may be vacated and a new trial granted, on the appli-
cation of the party aggrieved, for any of the following causes, 
materially affecting the substantial rights of such party: 
.... " After the amendment of that year the section read: 
"The verdict may be vacated and any other deCision may be 
modified or vacated, in whole or in part, and a new or further 
trial granted on all or part of the issues, on the application of 
the party aggrieved, for any of the following causes, materially 
affecting the substantial rights of such party: .... " 
The principal changes effected by the amendment were the 
addition of the words "modified," "in whole or in part," and 
"on all or part of the issues." Since it had earlier been held 
that a new trial could be limited by the trial court to partic-
ular issues, it was said in the Quevedo case that the purpose 
of the amendment could not have been merely to authorize 
such limited new trials and therefore must have been to 
restrict the trial court's jurisdiction to the exact terms of the 
motion. 
The statutory language itself does not expressly refer to 
jurisdiction and by no means compels the conclusion that the 
Legislature meant to affect jurisdiction. [13] Although the 
application of an aggrieved party is a jurisdictional require-
ment for new trial proceedings in California (Tabor v. 
S1'perior Court, 28 Ca1.2d505, 507 [170 P.2d 667] j Prothero 
v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. 439, 444 [238 P. 357] ; Ransome-
) 
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(1rummey CO. v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. 393, 398 [205 P. 
446] ; Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. California Dev. Co., 171 Cal. 
173, 194 [152 P. 542] i l(ohlstedt v. Hauseur, 24 Cal.App.2d 
60, 64 [74 P.2d 314]), there is no direct suggestion in the 
statute that the trial court, in correcting the error complained 
of, is limited to the method specified in the application. If 
the limited new trial sought would be prejudicial to the oppos-
ing party, the granting of a complete new trial is the most 
reasonable response to the motion. Moreover, if the language 
of section 657 is interpreted to restrict the trial court's power 
to either granting or denying a request for a limited new trial, 
then logic dictates that the statute should also be interpreted 
to restrict the trial court's power to either granting or 
denying a request fora complete new trial. The power of the 
trial court, however, to limit a new trial to particular issues, 
even when the motion was for a complete new trial, has not 
been questioned and was expressly recognized in the Quevedo 
case itself. 
[14] An examination of the legislative history of section 
657 shows that the purpose of the amendment of 1929 was 
unrelated to the jurisdictional question here presented. The 
changes in section 657 were effected by section 2 of chapter 
479 of the Statutes of 1929. Section 7 of chapter 479, 
enacted on the same day, added the following new section to 
the Code of Civil Procedure: "§ 662. In ruling on such 
motion, in a a cause tried without a jury, the court may, on 
such terms as may be just, change or add to the findings, 
modify the judgment in whole or in part, vacate the judg-
ment, in whole or in part, and grant a new trial on all or part 
of the issues, or, in lieu of granting a new trial, may vacate 
and set aside the findings and judgment and reopen the case 
for further proceedings and the introduction of additional 
eyidence with the same effect as if the case had been reopened 
after the submission thereof and before findings had been 
filed or judgment rendered. Any judgment thereafter entered 
shall be subject to the proviRions of sections 657 and 659 of 
this code. " 
Section 657 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a general 
section givillg the trial court authority to review its own 
judgments and setting forth the grounds 011 which review is 
to be made. Before 1929, such anthority was limited to grant-
ing new trials, but in that year the Legislature gave the trial 
court, in nonjury cases, the alternative power of modifying 
its judgments. To this end, section 662 was added to the 
,) 
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code, setting forth in detail the procedure for nonjury cases. 
An important purpose of the new section was the granting of 
authority to make partial changes in findings and judgments, 
and the words "modify," "in whole or in part," and "on 
all or part of the issues" were used to describe that authority. 
Since section 662 is concerned with a special application of the 
general power of review conferred by section 657, rewording 
of section 657 was also necessary to make it conform to the 
new procedure for nonjllry cases. Thus it was provided that 
decisions other than verdicts could be "modified" "in whole 
or in part" and new trials gran ted "on all or part of the 
issues." This phraseology is identical with that used in the 
newly added section 662. It is clear that the changes in section 
657 were intended to relate solely to the subject matter of 
section 662 and were not designed to alter the jurisdictional 
effect of a motion for new trial. To the extent that the Que-
vedo case holds to the contrary it is disapproved. 
The order granting a new trial on the issue of damages only 
is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court with 
directions to vacate the judgment and order a new trial on 
all issues. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
EDMONDS, J.-I concur in the judgment. As I under-
stand the rule now stated and applied, a plaintiff under the 
circumstances here shown may not, by limiting the scope of 
his motion for a new trial, restrict the action of the court in 
ruling upon it. 
However, the language of the opinion is inconsistent with 
the decision. It is said: j, [IJf the plaintiff does not wish a 
complete new trial, if he cannot have a partial new trial, he 
need simply say so. " Where is he to "say so'" Is he to state 
in his notice of motion that he is moving for a new trial on 
the issue of damages only 7 Or is he to "say so" in the pres-
entation of the motion 7 
In either event, what is the purpose of stating to the court, 
either in writing or orally, that the plaintiff does not wish 
a complete new trial if the statement is of no legal effect? 
The rule now laid down is that, in the sitnation shown by 
the present record, a plaintiff may not limit the action of the 
trial judge in ruling upon his motion. To suggest that, in 
some manner not specified, a plaintiff may make his wishes 
known to the court which is under no duty to consider them, 
-) 
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is to adt! confusion to proccdure and uncertainty in regard 
to the respective rights of the parties. 
Also, the court points out that, by compromise, the parties 
may wish to stand on the judgment. In that event, why should 
there be any motion for a new trial' The obvious rule that 
parties to litigation may stipulate to the amount of a judg-
ment needs no judicial recognition or approval. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
'l'he order granting plaintiff a new trial on the issue of 
damages should be affirmed. The trial court has exercised its 
discretion and determined that the evidence on liability was 
clearly sufficient (it denied defendants' motion for a new 
trial) and also that a limited new trial (damages only) was 
proper and not unjust to defendants-that there was no in· 
dication of a compromise verdict by the jury. I have dis-
cussed that phase of this case in my dissent in Leiperl v. 
Honold (ante, p. 471), and here adopt the views expressed 
there. 
There is an additional factor here presented. The· sole 
appeal was from the order granting plaintiffs a limited new 
trial; no appeal was taken from the judgment. The majority 
opinion nevertheless reverses the entire judgment on the 
ground that the issue of liability and damages are insep-
arable. With that I disagree. Indeed, this court held in 
Fuentes v. Tucker, 31 Ca1.2d 1 [187 P.2d 752], that it was 
error to admit evidence of liability where defendant admitted 
he was liable for the injuries suffered by plaintiff but denied 
the amount of damages claimed. Hence, the holding in the 
Fuentes case was not only that liability is severable from dam-
ages but it is error for the court to fail to treat it so. We 
have a similar quest.ion here, because by not appealing from 
the judgment, defendant is now in the position of admitting 
liability. The similarity between the rule in the Fuentes 
case and granting a new trial on the issue of damages alone 
was pointed out in Tumelty v. Pcerles.~ Stages, 96 Cal.App. 
530,535 [274 P. 430], where the court was discussing the lat-
ter question: "It is not at all rare or unusual for defendants 
in negligence cases to concede liability at the outset of a trial 
and to put before the jury the single question of the extent 
of plaintiff's damage. On principle there would seem to be 
no difference between the elimination of the issue of negligence 
by voluntary act of the defendant, and its elimination by the 
trial judge after the defendant has had his day in court Oft 
) 
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such issue, and tbe trial judge, who has heard all the evi-
dence, has become cOllvinced that nothing could be gained 
by relitigating that iSllue, and no prejudice suffered by not 
relitigatillg it." (Emphasis added.) 
It has been held repeatedly tbat in personal injury and 
wrongful death actions the issue of liability is severable from 
the issue of damages, and a new trial on the latter issue alone 
is proper. (Tumelty v. Peerless Stages, snpra, 96 Cal.App. 
530; Cox v. Tyrone Powcr Enterprises, Inc., 49 Cal.App.2d 
383 [121 P.2d 829] ; Bauman v. San Frallc'isco, 42 Cal.App.2d 
144 [l08 P.2d 989] ; Amore v. Di Resia, 125 Cal.App. 410 [13 
P.2d 986] ; Brush v. K1l7'stin, 11 Cal.App.2d 258 [53 P.2d 
777] ; Bellman v. Sa·n Fmncisco II. S. Dist., 11 Ca1.2d 576 
[81 P.2d 894] ; Hoffart v. Southern Pac. Co., 33 Ca1.App.2d 
591 [92 P.2d 436] ; Crandall v. McGrath, 51 Cal.App.2d 438 
[124 P.2d 858] ; Adams v. Hildebrand, 51 Cal.App.2d 117 [124 
P.2d 80] ; Rigall v. Lewis, 1 Cal.App.2d 737 [37 P.2d 97] ; 
Henslee v. Fox, 25 Cal.App.2d 286 [77 P.2d 307].) As said 
in Bauman v. San Francisco, supra, 42 Cal.App.2d 144, 160: 
"In its brief it is argued that the question of damages is 'so 
interwoven with the question of liability that the issues should 
not be segregated.' The issue of liability is clearly severable ! 
from the issue as to the amount of damage. The two issues 
are in no way connected. Since 1929, section 657 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure has expressly authorized the trial court 
in a proper case to grant a new trial on the issue of damages 
alone." (Emphasis added.) And the same is true where there 
is a reversal on appeal where the basis therefor goes to the i 
damage question only. (Southern Pac. :Uill. Co. v. Billiwhack, I 
etc. Farm, Ltd., 50 Cal.App.2d 79 [122 P.2d 650] ; . .voeller v. 
Market St. Ry. Co., 27 Cal.App.2d 562 [81 P.2d 475] ; Bellman 
v. San Francisco H. 8. Dist., 11 Ca1.2d 576 [81 P.2d 894] ; 
Pretzer v. California Transit Co., 211 Cal. 202 [294 P. 382] ; 
Paul v. Williams, 64 Cal.App.2d 696 [149 P.2d 284] ; Brewer v. 
Second Baptist Church, 32 Ca1.2d 791 [197 P.2d 713] ; Bishop 
v. Kelley, 100 Cal.App.2d 775 [224 P.2d 814]; Hollywood 
Cleaning & P. Co. v. Hollywood L. 8ervice, Ine., 217 Cal. 
131 [17 P.2d 712] ; 5 C.J.S., Appeal & Error, § 1935.) 
In an endeavor to escape the effect of the holding in these 
cases the majority opinion attempts to sidestep them by saying 
the jury has" inextricably interwoven those issues "-liability 
and damages. Although the jury instructions do not appear 
in the record they undoubtedly included the standard instruc-
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of damages until it bad found liability. (See Cal. Jury In-
structions, B.A.J.I., Instructions Nos. 112, 113, 114.) And 
that damages could not be allowed unless there was liability. 
It is prt'sumed that the jury followed those instructions. (2 
Cal.Jur. 871 j 24 Cal.Jur. 795-796.) A jury may be said to 
have rlisregarded the instrnctions only in the eyent that the 
evidence rloes not snpport the verdict. (Commonwealth Bond-
ing etc. Co. v. Pacific Elec. R. Co., 42 CaL\pp. 373 [184 P. 29] j 
Pidelity ((: Casualty Co. v. Llewellyn Iron Works, 42 Cal.App. 
766 [184 P. 402] j 24 Cal. Jur. 796.) Hence, there is no basis 
for the conclusion that the verdict was a compromise, and, as 
pointed out in my dissent in Leipert v. Honold, ante, p. 471 
[247 P.2d 324], that issue was resolved in accordance with 
the prt'sumption by the trial court. 
While the majority accuse the jury of compromising the 
issue of liability in this case, in my opinion the majority of 
this court is guilty of rendering a decision based upon a com-
promise, in the decision it has rendered today in this case. 
It will be remembered that in a former decision in this case the 
majority of this court held that since there was no appeal from 
the jndgment this court was without jurisdiction to review 
the judgment and was limited to a comdderation of defend-
ant's appt'al from the order of the trial court granting plain-
tiff's motion for a new trial on the issue of damages only. 
It thereupon reversed this order which meant that the judg-
ment of $1,000 was reinstated and plaintiff had no further 
opportunity to obtain redress for the injuries suffered by 
him as the result of the negligence of the defendant. (See 
[Cal.] 240 P .2d 298.) 
In my dissent to the former decision of this court in this 
case I stated: "In view of the foregoing, for this court to 
find the trial court guilty of an abuse of discretion in granting 
a new trial on the issue of damages only, and reverse the 
order, thus entitling the defendant to recover his costs on 
appeal, with no opportunity for the plaintiff to ever retry 
the case or obtain further redress, is, to my mind, not only 
unsound from the standpoint of legal reasoning, but is so 
cruel and inhuman as to shock the sense of justice of all who 
may read the majority opinion." ([Cal.] 240 P.2d 303.) 
A petition for rehearing was filed by plaintiff and a rehear. 
in~ was granted by vote of the following members of this 
eourt: Chief .Tustice Gibson, Justice Shenk and myself. Justice 
Edmonds being absent from the state, Justice Dooling of the 
First Appellate District was assigned to sit in his place, and 
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Justice Dooling also voted for a rehearing. Justices Traynor, 
Schauer and Spence all voted against the granting of a rehear-
ing. Anticipating that plaintiff's petition for a rehearing 
would be denied, I prepared a dissenting opinion which I 
intended to file upon the entry of the order of denial which 
was as follows: 
"I dissent from the order denying a rehearing in this case 
and feel constrained to write an opinion expressing my views 
because of certain points raised in Respondent's Petition for 
Rehearing which were not discussed in either the majority or 
dissenting opinions now on file. 
"Respondent's Petition for Rehearing calls attention to the 
fact that the judgment, entered in the trial court, conclusively 
established the liability of the defendant, and is now final 
since no appeal was taken therefrom and is res adjudicata on 
the issue of defendant's negligence and the absence of con-
tributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. In other 
words, there is a final judgment which establishes defendant's 
liability for the injuries suffered by plaintiff and the majority 
opinion holds that there is ample evidence to support this 
judgment. The only appeal in this case is from the order 
granting plaintiff's and respondent's motion for a new trial 
on the issue of damages only. This presents a question as to 
the scope of review of this court on the appeal from such order. 
It appears to be the settled rule that in reviewing an order 
of this character the only issue involved is one of damages; 
that is, the amount to which plaintiff is entitled in view of 
the nature and extent of the injuries suffered by him, the 
extent of the disability, if any, which will result from such 
injuries and the amount necessarily expended and which he 
will be required to expend in the future because of such 
injuries as disclosed by the evidence. Upon a consideration 
of this evidence this court must determine whether or not the 
trial court abused its discretion in granting plaintiff's motion 
for a new trial on the issue of damages only. Since the judg-
ment established the liability of the defendant for plaintiff's 
injuries and no appral has been taken from the judgment, this 
court has no power to review the issne of liability as that issue 
is not before this court on this appeal. The defendant, by 
not appealing from the judgment, i!l conclusively presumed 
to be satisfied with it ancl his only ('oncern is the retrial of 
the issue of damages. 
"This proposition is clearly stated in 2 Cal.Jur., page 828. 
'Upon an appeal from an order upon a motion for a new trial, 
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when allowed, the appPllatc court is limiteo in its review of the 
action of the trial court to the grounds upon which such a 
motion was based, and upon which the new trial was asked in 
thc particular I'ase. The Role object of an appeal from an 
order granting a llew trial is to determine whether the court 
erred in granting the motion on the record made up by the 
moving party, in respect to anyone or all the grounds stated 
in the specifications presented by the moving party. And 
nothing can be considered on the appeal that does not go to 
show that a re-examination of fact is necessary for the protec-
tion of the rights of the appealing party. This precludes' 
a review of errors apparent upon the face of the judgment-
roll, such as, for example, the insufficiency of the complaint 
or findings to support the judgment.' This proposition is 
not discussed in the majority opinion and it is evident that I 
those who concurred therein did not give consideration to 
respondent's contention that the issue of liability was settled 
by the final judgment, and therefore, the scope of the review on 
the appeal from the order granting the motion for a new 
trial on the issue of damages only is limited to matters relat-
ing to that issue. 
"Obviously, the plaintiff would not appeal from the judg-
ment as it was in his favor on the only issues which were 
determined by it after the entry of the order granting plain-
tiff's motion for a new trial on the issue of damages only. 
The defendant was the only party aggrieved by the judgment 
as it determined that defendant was guilty of negligence 
which was the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the 
plaintiff and established defendant's liability for such injuries. 
"The theory of the majority opinion is that the order grant-
ing plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the issue of damages 
only must be reversed because the jury failed to determine 
the issue of liability. The logical result of this reasoning is 
that the judgment is void because the issue of liability was 
not determined, and therefore, no valid award of damages 
could be made. However, the settled rule is that the issue of 
liability can only be reviewed upon an appeal from the judg-
ment, and if no appeal is taken, and the judgment becomes 
final, it is res adjudicata and cannot be collaterally attacked. 
The majority holding in this case amounts to a collateral 
attack upon the judgment. To be logical, the majority should 
order the judgment set aside and vacated as no amount of 
damages can be awarded unless the liability of the defendant 
is first established. 
) 
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"The foregoing is the only reasonable and logical deduc-
tion which can be made from the reasoning of the majority 
in this case although the majority opinion does not consider 
the case from this point of view. 
"The patent error on the face of the majority opinion is 
that it treats defendant's appeal from the order granting 
plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the issue of damages 
only the same as if defendant had appealed from the judg-
ment. An appeal from the judgment would confer upon this 
court jurisdiction to review the issue of liability also. This 
was the situation in the cases where the appellate court 
reviewed both issues and gave consideration to the question as 
to whether the inadequacy of the award of damages was the 
result of a compromise of the issue of liability. Here the 
issue of liability was determined by the verdict and is now 
set in concrete by the finality of the judgment. This issue 
cannot now be reviewed and the judgment is not subject to 
collateral attack under any rule of law that can be found in 
the books. The majority squarely holds that the order of the 
trial court denying defendant's motion for a new trial can 
be reviewed only on an appeal from the judgment, and since 
no appeal was taken from the judgment, this court is without 
jurisdiction to review the judgment or the denial of defend-
ant's motion. Yet the majority proceed and review the only 
issue determined by the jUdgment-the issue of liability-and 
holds that such issue was not determined properly because it 
was the result of a compromise. In other words, the majority 
does that which it says this court has no jurisdiction to do. 
What more could the majority have done on an appeal from 
the judgment' It has reviewed the evidence of negligence 
and contributory negligence and holds that these issues were 
properly submitted to the jury and that the evidence was suffi-
cient to justify the verdict in favor of plaintiff. For all that 
appears there were no other issues of fact or law except the 
issue of damages. It would seem that the majority has 
resorted to double talk in a vain attempt to sustain its unsound 
position. 
"The majority opinion contains the following statement: 
( (Cal.] 240 P .2d 302.) 'If the plaintiff prefers a new 
trial on all issues to none at all, he can move for a complete 
new trial and in his argument on the motion urge the trial 
court to limit the new trial to the question of damages; or he 
can make an alternative motion, asking for a limited new 
trial and if that cannot be granted for a complete new trial.' 
) 
) 
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The reasoning of the majority in the foregoing statement is 
somewhat obscure, as the majority does not attempt to point· 
out how the plaintiff could be benefited by making a motion 
for a new trial on all issues if the court should grant the 
motion on the issue of damages only and the defendant should 
appeal from the order granting such limited new trial. Cer-
tainly, the scope of review would not be enlarged because the 
plaintiff made his motion for a new trial on all issues. It is 
the scope of the order of the trial court granting the motion 
for a new trial which determines the scope of review on appeal. 
The quoted statement from the majority opinion can afford 
little solace to a plaintiff who has been awarded a new trial 
on the issue of damages only and this court sees fit to reverse 
such order as it did in this case. 
"It seems both unfortunate and unwise to me to permit the 
ill-considered, illogical, unsound and unjust majority opinion 
to stand as a precedent to confuse, mislead and befuddle trial 
judges, lawyers and litigants, so long as the majority of this 
court blindly persist in perpetuating such an erroneous 
pronouncement.' , 
Of course, the foregoing dissent was not filed because a 
rehearing was granted. 
It now appears to me that in order for the majority to avoid 
the shocking injustice which would result from its former 
decision, it has rewritten its decision on a theory entirely out 
of harmony with every other decision on the subject, and 
by implication, at least, has overruled numerous cases without 
even citing them. At this point I cannot refrain from remark-
ing that this practice is entirely out of harmony with my idea 
of how to run a court and develop a system of jurisprudence. 
It seems to me that if the majority decision is to stand, a 
trial judge, in considering a motion for a new trial on the 
ground that the damages awarded are either inadequate or 
excessive, must weigh the evidence on liability and base his 
conclusion as to the adequacy of the damages awarded on the 
strength or weakness of the evidence of liability. In other 
words he should be clairvoyant to the extent of ascertaining 
how much the verdict was increased or decreased by the evi-
dence on the issue of liability. Every lawyer or judge who 
has tried a damage suit knows this cannot be done. But the 
majority of this court can look at a cold record and say just 
what took place in the jury room. At least, that is what the 
) 
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majority has done in these four cases.· The position of the 
majority would amuse those who have had experience in the 
trial of jury cases if it were not fraught with such dire 
consequences in the administration of justice. Weare sup-
posed to have a judicial system which reposes broad discre-
tion in our trial judges. It has been said that they are some-
thing more than referees or umpires. The decided cases 
generally hold that in the conduct of a trial the opinion of a 
trial judge as to the effect on the jury of instructions of the 
court and remarks of counsel are controlling on an appellate 
court. In fact, in the very field here involved, the discretion 
of the trial judge has been upheld in all but four cases with 
the exception of these four cases. And, as pointed out in my 
dissent in Leipert v. Honold, ante, pp. 471, 474, the rule here 
announced is based upon statements contained in decisions 
which did not purport to review the exercise of the discretion 
of a trial judge in granting a new trial on the issue of dam-
ages only, but where a new trial had been denied and the 
appellate court was asked to reverse with directions to retry 
the issue of damages only. The majority seize upon these 
statements and ignore all that is said in the decisions uphold-
ing the discretion of the trial judge in granting such limited 
new trial of which there are 27 according to my research (see 
ante, pp. 474,475). 
While the theory upon which the majority decision is based 
does not require it, the majority has seen fit to change the 
settled rule that a trial court may not grant a complete new 
trial when a limited new trial only is demanded (see Quevedo 
v. Superior Court, 131 Cal.App. 698 [21 P.2d 998]). It will 
be remembered that both the appellant and respondent took 
the position at the oral argument of this case that the Quevedo 
case is sound law, and I am unable to follow the reasoning of 
the majority in holding that a new trial may be granted on 
grounds other than those upon which the motion is made. 
Aside from the basic unsoundness of this holding, the mischief 
which may flow therefrom staggers the imagination. While 
conceding, as it mnst, that a notice of intention to move for 
a new trial is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial 
court to grant a motion for a new trial, the majority, by a 
peculiar process of reasoning seem to hold that because a 
trial court could grant a limiteo new trial in a case where 
"Leipert v. HOMld, ante, p. 462 [247 P.2d 324]; Cary v. Wentzel, 
ante, p. 491 [247 P.2d 341]; Rose v. Meloily Lane, ante, p. 481 
[247 P.2d 335]. 
) 
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a eompletc new trial if: demanded, it should have power to 
grant a complete new trial where a limited new trial is 
demanded. This is the equivalent of saying that although a 
notice of intention to move for a new trial specifies only one 
ground for the motion, the court may grant it on all the statu-
tory grounds. This is contrary to every decision on the 
subject of new trials. (See Sitkei v. Frimel, 85 Cal.App.2d 
335 [192 P.2d 820] ; Jeffords v. Young, 197 Cal. 224, 228 [239 
P. 1054] ; Smith v. ]bas, 22 Cal.App.2d 551 [71 P.2d 847] ; 
Polk v. Boggs, 122 Cal. 114. [54 P. 536] ; Laver v. Hotaling, 
115 Cal. 613 [47 P. 593] ; Estudillo v. Security Loan etc. 00., 
158 Cal. 66 [109 P. 884] ; Strange v. Strange, 23 Cal.App. 281 
[137 P. 1104] ; Johnston v. Blanchard, 16 Cal.App. 321 [116 
P. 973] ; Oooper v. Superior Oourt, 12 Cal.App.2d 336 [55 
P.2d 299] ; 20 Cal.Jur. 162-163.) In Watkins v. Nutting, 17 
Ca1.2d 490, 499 [110 P.2d 384], this court said: "A notice of 
intention to move for a new trial upon one or more of the 
grounds specified in the Code of Civil Procedure is essential 
to the court's jurisdiction. (Smith v. Ibos, 22 Cal.App.2d 551 
[71 P.2d 847] ; Peters v. Anderson, 113 Cal.App. 158 [298 P. 
76].) " 
Obviously a motion for a new trial on the issue of damages 
only would have to be made upon the ground that the evidence 
was insufficient to support the award of damages. (See Lei. 
pert v. HO/lold, ante, p. 471.) The defendant comes into 
court to oppose this motion and learns for the first time that 
the court intends to hear argument in support of a motion for 
a complete new trial on all statutory grounds or on some 
other ground than that specified in the notice. He would 
justly have cause for complaint, and he would be supported 
by all of the decided cases. But if the majority opinion here 
is permitted to stand, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant 
will have any idea as to what might happen when a notice 
of intention to move for a new trial on a limited issue is filed. 
This is not and should not be the law. 
I have hereinbefore stated that the majority are guilty of 
rendering a compromise decision, and I think I have demon-
strated the truth of that statement. The majority opinion 
holds, contrary to all the decided cases, that evidence of 
liability may be considered in determining the adequacy of 
the award of damages; that a complete new trial on all issues 
may be granted when a new trial is demanded on a limited 
issue only (likewise contrary to all decided cases); that al-
though no appeal is taken from a judgment which establishes 
